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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF PROVO, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
FRANK LIFANG, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 940717-CA 
Category No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF DEFEND ANT-APPELLANT 
COMES NOW Defendant-Appellant and herewith submits his reply to the brief of Plaintiff-
Appellee as follows: 
POINT I 
U.C.A. §76-5-106.5 IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD BECAUSE IT MAKES 
A SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNT OF CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED ACTIVITY 
UNLAWFUL 
A. Defendant-Appellant's Standing to Raise Issue of Statute's Facial Overbreadth. 
The government misinterprets the law as to standing. [Brief of Appellee, at 10] For two 
reasons this Appellant has standing: (1) First Amendment issues are at stake, and (2) Rights of 
Association are also impaired by statute. The law set out in Provo City Corp. V. Willden, 768 P.2d 
455, 457-58 (Utah 1989) makes it clear that a person, when arguing that a statute is facially 
overbroad, can still make a claim of "overbreadth" when a person is subjected to a statute which 
"chills the exercise of First Amendment rights of others." Id., at 457. The rationale for allowing an 
imperfect plaintiff standing is because the First Amendment protected interests are so important that 
their protection need not wait for the perfect plaintiff. Id. Because the Stalking Statute includes 
elements that require verbal or written communications, it is very clear that First Amendment issues 
are at stake. Because they are at stake, the Court need not wait for the perfect plaintiff. The 
government correctly points out an overbreadth challenge can be made where standing exists because 
"rights of association were ensnared in statutes which, by their broad sweep, might result in burdening 
innocent associations." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973). Rights of association 
are clearly at issue in this anti-stalking statute because the statute itself can require proximity to a 
specific person, and rights of association are directly associated with proximity to a person. 
B. The Statute's Overbreadth. 
The government attempts to limit the First Amendment to "only spoken words." [See 
generally, Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973)]. By arguing that when speech is 
accompanied by conduct, such speech is no longer protected by the First Amendment. [Brief of 
Appellee, at 11 ("The Utah statute does not regulate speech alone, but speech accompanied by 
conduct.")]. The government wrongly relies on Broadrick for the idea that the First Amendment 
applies only to spoken words. In Broacbick, the conduct at issue was against the law in and of itself— 
(solicitation of campaign funds as a state employee). In the case at bar, the conduct accompanying 
the speech is being in the presence of someone, which clearly is not illegal. The government argues 
that speech "accompanied by conduct in the form of addressing" another person is not protected by 
the First Amendment. This is an erroneous interpretation of this constitutionally protected right. The 
very foundations of the First Amendment presumes that such speech will be heard by specific people. 
This is true whether the communication is heated and even offends people. To rule otherwise would 
2 
place every Utah business person, legislator, lawyer or sibling under the over inclusive cloud of the 
Utah Stalking statute if they simply contact someone twice and cause the person hurt feelings. 
The government correctly points out that an overbreadth challenge can be made where 
standing exists because "rights of association [are] ensnared in statutes which, by their broad sweep, 
might result in burdening innocent associations," [Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413. U.S. 601, 612 
(1973)], but also argues that by requiring the course of conduct to be intentional and specifically 
directed at a particular person, the Utah Stalking statute does not burden innocent associations. [Brief 
of Appellee, at 13]. The scenarios set out on page 10 of Appellant's brief are clearly intentional and 
directed toward a specific person, i.e., intentionally approaching a mechanic, a lawyer, a repairman 
or a restauranteur to complain about perceived inefficiencies with a product or service. The course 
of conduct proscribed by the statute is so expansive as to criminalize legitimate and protected conduct 
simply because the conduct is intentionally directed toward a particular person. Under the current 
statute and the government's interpretation of the statute, even siblings could be prosecuted if they 
intentionally quarreled with and hurt another's feelings. Relying on "intentional conduct" as the mens 
rea of the crime does not afford adequate protection for innocent associations. 
The government argues that Appellant has not presented any credible evidence that the 
statute's overbreadth is real and substantial [Brief of Appellee, at 16], and that a person does not have 
a constitutionally protected right to intentionally communicate with another when the communication 
eventually results in emotional distress to the person to whom the communication is being made. The 
government errs in its interpretation of the First Amendment. If the Constitution were intended to 
protect only that speech which is not stressful or disturbing, the exceptions would quickly swallow 
the rule. In contrast to the government's position, the First Amendment is specifically meant to 
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protect speech that is distressing, unpopular or disturbing. 
The government argues that a limiting construction of the statute could ensure that it is 
applied only to the type of conduct the legislature seemed to find odious enough to criminalize. [Brief 
of Appellee, at 16]. The government points to the language in the statute that requires that the 
alleged victim must reasonably suffer emotional distress, thus attempting to demonstrate a cure for 
the statute's overbreadth. But even limiting this one element of the crime does not cure the statute's 
overbreadth. To limit application of the statute to those instances where a "victim" has been 
"reasonably" distressed is to argue that the statute is meant to criminalize upsetting another. Making 
someone feel emotional distress should not be made illegal. The statute essentially prohibits 
legitimate intentional confrontations that occur every day between neighbors, businessmen and even 
families. Simply finding that the statute prohibits contact with another that causes the other to 
"reasonably" feel distressed, as opposed to contact in which the other is "unreasonably" distressed, 
does not cure the statute's overbreadth. This Appellant has a constitutional right to speak to another 
person, even if the other is "reasonably" disturbed by that contact. 
POINT n 
THE UTAH STALKING STATUTE IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE FACIALLY 
BECAUSE IT DOES NOT CLEARLY DEFINE WHAT CONDUCT IS PROHIBITED. 
The government correctly points out that in considering a facial vagueness challenge to a 
statute, as opposed to a facial overbreadth challenge, Appellant must show that the enactment 
implicates constitutionally protected conduct, or show that the enactment is impermissibly vague in 
all of its applications. Village of Hoffman Estates v. F/ipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 
494-95 (1982). It is also true that a person that engages in some conduct that is "clearly proscribed 
cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others." Id. At 495. The 
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problem with the government's analysis is that the statute at issue does not specify "conduct that is 
clearly proscribed," thus encouraging arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the statute. [See 
Kolender v. Lcnvson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1982)]. Minimal guidelines to govern and direct law 
enforcement do not exist in this statute; it does not clearly describe what Mr. Lifang could or could 
not do. The statute affords police and prosecutors almost unlimited discretion to decide when it has 
been violated. [See Kolander, at 360 (stating that when full discretion is given to the police to decide 
which conduct is criminal, a statute must fail for vagueness)]. "Repeatedly maintaining a visual or 
physical proximity to a person or repeatedly conveying verbal or written threats or threats implied 
by conduct or a combination thereof directed at or toward a person" does not give a police officer 
adequate instructions on enforcement of this statute. This statute merely "furnishes a convenient tool 
for harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials." [Kolender, at 360]. In this 
case, there was no evidence of threats being made toward the alleged victim. Ms. Roring testified 
at trial that Appellant never threatened her or any of her family members with physical harm. 
[Transcript at 70-73]. Furthermore, the transcript is replete with testimony from the witnesses and 
the security staff that Appellant never made any treats to physically harm Roring or any of her family 
members. Appellant also testified that Ms. Roring was never afraid of him. [Transcript at 239]. 
Therefore, the police were left with enforcing the statute based solely on Appellant's "maintaining 
a visual or physical proximity to a person." How close does a person have to be? Maintaining such 
proximity easily includes casual contact with those with whom we work, study and worship on a 
repeated basis. The definition of "course of conduct" in the statute is plainly too vague to prevent 
unfettered interpretations made by law enforcement officials. 
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POINT ra 
THE UTAH STATUTE IS DIFFERENT THAN OTHER STATUTES THAT HAVE NOT 
BEEN HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
The Utah Statute is unlike the statutes of some other states that have been scrutinized for 
constitutionality. [See Brief of Appellee, at 17, 24]. The Utah anti-stalking statute's "course of 
conduct" is satisfied by intentionally being in visual or physical proximity to a person twice. It does 
not require a plan, or a pattern or a series of events, but only two isolated—even accidental-
encounters would suffice according to the plain language. Therefore, the statute violates the Due 
Process Clause of both the U.S. Constitution and the Utah Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
Section 76-5-106.5 is overbroad facially and as applied to this case. It also fails to clearly 
define prohibited conduct in a manner that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand. It 
violated Appellant's guarantees of equal protection and uniform operation of laws. The government 
has not adequately argued that the statute can be enforced without violating these constitutional 
protections, even with limiting construction. This Court should rule the statute unconstitutional and 
reverse the trial court's denial of Appellant's Motion to Dismiss. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of October, 1995. 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
THOMAS H. MEANS 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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